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Abstract
A “new vicarious antitrust liability doctrine”” has emerged from a
recent Supreme Court decision2 that combines the agency concept of
apparent authority with civil antitrust liability.’
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Introduction
A "new vicarious antitrust liability doctrine"" has emerged from a
recent Supreme Court decision 2 that combines the agency concept of
apparent authority with civil antitrust liability.' American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. for the first time, 4 permits an agent acting against the interests of his principal but with apparent authority 5 to subject the principal to antitrust law's punitive
treble damages.6 Even outside the antitrust arena, punitive damages
1. Howe & Badger, The Antitrust Challenge to Non-Profit CertificationOrganizations: Conflicts of Interest and a PracticalRule of Reason Approach to Certification
Programsas Industry-Wide Builders of Competition and Efficiency, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
357, 361 (1982).
2. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935
(1982).
3. See generally Appleson, Errant Volunteers Put Associations In Peril, 68
A.B.A. J. 796 (1982).
4. 102 S. Ct. at 1950 (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from
and in accordance with the other's manifestation to such third persons." RESTATEMENT
(1957).
For other definitions of apparent authority see W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY §§ 8D, 18B, 22 (1964); H. REUSHLIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8

§ 23 (1979); infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
6. The Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. 15 (1976) provides for treble damages in
Sherman Act § 1 and other antitrust violations and is as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
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were not imposed when apparent agency served as the basis of the principal's liability.7 On its journey to this land of expanded antitrust liability, the High Court picked up an unsuspecting passenger.8 A nonprofit
organization fell victim to these untried extremes of agency and antitrust liability, and for the first time was hit with the sanction of treble
damages."
In Hydrolevel, the distension of these areas of liability was discreetly masked in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion but partially
unveiled by Justice Powell in a vigorous dissent. 10 This comment examines Hydrolevel's unclear path of vicarious antitrust liability and the
Court's explication of the principles involved in its decision.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.
Background
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) is one of
the oldest and largest scientific societies in the United States."" It is a
nonprofit, tax-exempt' 2 organization with more than "90,000 members
drawn from all fields of mechanical engineering."1 s ASME's primary
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
7. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
8. See generally Young, Court Widens Treble Damage Liability For Non-Profit
Societies, 68 A.B.A. J. 846 (1982).
9. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), allowed the application
of antitrust laws to nonprofit organizations but Goldfarb called for flexibility in imposing sanctions on such organizations. Id. at 788 n.17. Hydrolevel is the first case imposing the treble damages sanction upon a nonprofit entity. 102 S. Ct. at 1949 n.2, 1950.
10. In the 6-3 decision five justices supported the expansion of antitrust liability
in an apparent agency context. Chief Justice Burger rejected the majorities' new vicarious liability approach but concurred in the judgment by utilizing the agency doctrine of
ratification. 102 S. Ct. at 1948. The ratification doctrine imposes liability on the principal only after he expressly or impliedly condones the agent's activities. Id. Justices
White and Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Id. at 1949.
11. For a general historical overview of ASME see B. SINCLAIR, A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, 1880 - 1980 (Univ.

of Toronto Press 1980).
12.

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954) - As a "corporation.

.

.or foundation organized

and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes .
13. 102 S.Ct. at 1938.
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function is drafting, publishing and interpreting more than 400 separate codes for the industry. 4 Thousands of ASME volunteers participate on the committees and subcommittees overseeing this process.1 5
Two ASME volunteers, acting against the organization's interests,
fraudulently interpreted a single provision in an 18,000 page code1 6 and
thereby subjected ASME to antitrust law's treble damages and a $7.5
million verdict at trial.17
One of the volunteers, John James, served as vice-chairman of the
ASME subcommittee responsible for drafting and interpreting the code
section governing fuel safety devices in boilers. James concurrently
served as vice-president of McDonnell and Miller"" (M&M), the dominant force in the fuel safety device market for more than fifty years. 19
The other ASME volunteer, Subcommittee Chairman T. R. Hardin,
was executive vice-president of Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and
Insurance Company, the nation's leading underwriter of boiler
insurance.2 0

14. In theory ASME codes are merely advisory and not binding on anyone. However, in practice the codes are highly influential and a manufacturer whose product
cannot satisfy the applicable ASME code is at a great disadvantage in the marketplace. 102 S. Ct. at 1938.
ASME codes are incorporated by reference into regulations on the federal, state
and local levels and in all but one of the provinces of Canada. Id.
15. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118,
121 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
16. ASME's Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was the subject of the Hydrolevel
litigation. ASME receives 20,000 - 30,000 inquiries a year seeking its interpretation.
102 S. Ct. at 1949.
17. The District Court's finding of liability was affirmed, but a new trial for
damages was ordered by the circuit court because the method utilized for assessing and
trebling damages was incorrect. 635 F.2d at 128.
18. It was common for ASME committee members to be employed by business
entities directly affected by the ASME codes. The conflicts of interest that arose did
not serve as a pretext for ASME's liability in Hydrolevel. Arguably, they could.
19. M & M annually controlled more than 85% of the $10 million market for
boiler fuel safety devices. Meyer, Knocking the Competition - How Rivals' Use of
"Industry Code" Report Created Problemsfor a Tiny Company, Wall St. J., July 9,
1974, at 36, col. 1.
20. Plaintiff's First Amended Antitrust Complaint at 3, Hydrolevel Corp. v.
American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, No. 75 Civ. 1360 (E.D.N.Y. December 4,
1978).
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International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT)21 purchased M&M
in 1971. ITT acquired a controlling interest in Hartford Steam in
1970.22 Capitalizing on their positions as chairman and vice-chairman
of the ASME boiler subcommittee, ITT's agents, Hardin and James,
without ASME's knowledge or possible benefit, conspired to destroy
M&M/ITT's newest competitor, the Hydrolevel Corporation.
ASME's procedure for dealing with public inquiries regarding the
ASME codes granted a high level of discretion to highly placed officials
such as Hardin and James. 2s Hardin as subcommittee chairman had
the authority to personally interpret the ASME code in response to a
public inquiry merely by terming the response an "unofficial communication. 2 4 The "unofficial" response then bypassed full subcommittee
review and was mailed out to the inquiring party.2 5 This ASME procedure served as the mechanism by which ITT and its agents, Hardin
and James, were able to ruin the Hydrolevel Corporation.2 6
Soon after Hydrolevel lured a major customer away from M&M,
James, other M&M officials and Hardin met to plan a course of action.
The ASME committeemen drafted a letter for M&M asking ASME if
Hydrolevel's new fuel safety device with a time delay satisfied the
Boiler Code. 27 After receiving the inquiry, ASME referred it to sub-

21. "ITT is a diversified company with subsidiaries and divisions located
throughout the United States and the world." When this suit arose ITT had annual
sales in excess of $5 billion. Id.
22. In 1970, ITT acquired 99% of the outstanding stock in Hartford Fire Insurance Corp., a Connecticut corporation which owned approximately 11% of the outstanding common stock in Hartford Steam. Id.
23. 102 S.Ct. at 1939, 1940.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The ease with which an ASME agent could manipulate this procedure to
accomplish bad faith objectives suggests the direct fault of ASME for failing to guard
against such misconduct. However, instead of simply premising ASME's liability on
some fault of the organization, the appellate court and the Supreme Court, for the first
time, founded antitrust liability upon a no-fault apparent authority theory, i.e. even if
ASME did everything possible to prevent misconduct by its officials and was blameless
in its own right, liability would exist solely because of the agency status of the wrongdoers, which created the appearance of actual authority. See supra note 5.
27. 102 S.Ct. at 1939. Both M & M and Hydrolevel manufactured products
that automatically cut off the fuel supply to the boiler before the water level became
dangerously low. Hydrolevel's new device included a time-delay designed to prevent
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committee chairman Hardin for a reply. Hardin and James then
drafted a response to their own inquiry which cast doubt upon the
safety of Hydrolevel's product. 8
As planned, M&M/ITT seized upon this fraudulent interpretation
of the code to disparage Hydrolevel's product. M&M/ITT saturated
the marketplace with anti-time-delay propaganda informing prospective purchasers that Hydrolevel's device failed to meet ASME
standards. 9
Hydrolevel, although unaware of M&M/ITT's scheme, learned of
the incorrect ASME code interpretation and demanded that ASME

send corrections to those who received the faulty information." Three
months later ASME mailed Hydrolevel a letter that "confirmed the
intent" of part of the faulty code interpretation letter but, in effect,
admitted that the Hydrolevel product did not violate the code.31 Following an investigation into the faulty code interpretation, ASME, still
believing in the good faith of Hardin and James' acts, concluded that
its officials had acted properly.3 2 Ultimately, the ITT scheme against
Hydrolevel was uncovered by a Senate subcommittee.3 3 However, the
aspersions cast upon the time-delay device by M&M/ITT were never
fully extracted from the minds of a wary buying public. 4 Hydrolevel
brought an antitrust action against M&M/ITT, Hartford Steam and
ASME and in 1979 sold all assets except the lawsuit for a salvage price

premature fuel cut offs. The device allowed the fuel supply to continue for a short time
when the overall water level was safe but occasionally fell below the minimum acceptable level because of surging water inside the boiler. Id. at 1939 n.1.
28. The reply letter said in part, "If a time delay feature were incorporated in a
low water fuel cut-off, there would be no positive assurance that the boiler water would
not fall to a dangerous point during a time delay period." 635 F.2d 122.
29. M & M included a copy of the fraudulent reply letter in a booklet entitled
"The Opposition - Who They Are, How To Beat Them." The booklet, distributed to M
& M salesmen, stated, "A time delay of any kind would very definitely be against the
ASME code....
[T]his should definitely be brought to the attention of anyone considering the device. . .

."

635 F.2d at 123.

30. 102 S. Ct. at 1940.
31. ASME stated, "[T]here is no intent in Section IV to prohibit the use of low
water fuel cutoffs having time delays ...

"

635 F.2d 123.

32. 102 S. Ct. at 1941.
33. Id.
34. See Wall St. J., July 9, 1974, at 36, col. 1.
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of $86,000.
Action in the District Court
In 1979, a jury in federal district court held ASME liable for antitrust damages of $7.5 million, three times the actual damages suffered
by Hydrolevel.33 Hydrolevel requested a jury instruction permitting apparent authority as a basis of liability but the trial judge rejected such
an approach.3 6 Instead, since the scheme against Hydrolevel was
outside the scope of employment of the ASME officials, the jury was
told to find ASME liable only if the organization was at fault by ratifying or adopting as its own the misconduct of Hardin and James .
Judge Weinstein charged:
If the officers or agents act on behalf of interests adverse to the
corporation or acted for their own economic benefit or the benefit
of another person or corporation, and this action was not ratified or
adopted by the defendant, ASME, their misconduct cannot be con35. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, No. 75 Civ. 1360
(E.D.N.Y. 1978). ASME was held liable under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. § (1976).
Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspir-.
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments in
the discretion of the court. Id.
See supra note 6, the Clayton Act § 4 allowing a private right of action for treble
damages.
In stark contrast to the large trial court judgment assessed against ASME, the
ITT owned instigators and beneficiaries of the scheme to destroy Hydrolevel, M & M
and Hartford Steam, settled out of court for $725,000 and $75,000 respectively. 102 S.
Ct. at 1945 n.1.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's imposition of liability against ASME but ordered a new trial on damages. 635 F.2d 118, 131.
36. 635 F.2d at 124. For definitions of apparent authority see supra note 5.
37. 102 S. Ct. at 1941. See also id. at 1948 (Burger, J., concurring).
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sidered that of the corporation with which they are associated."

Based on this instruction, the jury found ASME at fault and
therefore, liablefor treble damages.

The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court Adopt a New Theory of Liability
To hold ASME liable, the appellate court and the Supreme Court
needed only to affirm the jury's finding of liability which was based on
traditional antitrust-agency concepts." Instead, both courts disregarded the jury finding offault and imputed liability to ASME based
on a new no fault vicarious antitrust liability doctrine.4" ASME was
held to be a vicarious coconspirator to an unreasonable restraint of
trade solely because the misconduct of ITT's agents appeared to be
authorized by ASME.' 1
Justice Powell argues in the dissent that:
[T]he very facts of this case belie the necessity of simply creatinga
new theory of liability; the jury found ASME liable not upon a
theory of apparent authority but upon the traditional basis of ratification or authorization. The apparent authority rationale was not
even argued to the Second Circuit on appeal. The Second Circuit,
and now this Court, reach out unnecessarily to embrace a dubious
new doctrine. That the Court chooses the case of a nonprofit, taxexempt organization
to announce its new rule is particularly
2
inappropriate.4

The circuit court did not explain the benefit produced by the decision
to promulgate this new vicarious antitrust liability doctrine when the
defendant's liability was already decided on traditional antitrust
38. Id. at 1941.
39. See id. at 1951, 1955.
40. 635 F.2d at 124.
41. Id. at 127. "For ASME to be held liable, then, Hydrolevel had to demonstrate only that ASME's agents acted within their apparent authority when participating in the conspiracy; it did not have to demonstrate that they also acted to benefit
ASME or that ASME later ratified their actions." Id. The court also characterized
ASME's involvement in the scheme as "unintentional participation." Id. at 131.
42. 102 S. Ct. at 1951.
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grounds. For potential antitrust defendants, "as well as ASME, the approach adopted by the Second Circuit [and the Supreme Court] can be
viewed only as a tragic and confusing chapter in antitrust history."4
The Supreme Court Opinion
In affirming ASME's liability for the unauthorized actions of the
nonprofit organization's agents, the Supreme Court, for the first time,
holds that apparent authority can serve as an appropriate basis for imputing antitrust liability. 44 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, adheres to much of the Second Circuit's logic and continually focuses
upon the possible anticompetitive effects from standard-setting organi5
zations such as ASME.4

While Hydrolevel involves many agency and antitrust principles,
the majority primarily emphasizes antitrust law's purpose of deterring
anticompetitive activities.46 Arguably, in doing so, the Court fails to
reconcile the new no fault doctrine with well-established rules of antitrust and agency law that disallow imputation of antitrust liability to a
principal who is not at fault and does not stand to benefit from the
agent's misconduct.47 Justice Blackmun partially concedes that his po-

43.

Howe & Badger, supra note 1, at 387.
[T]he Second Circuit proceeded to adopt a vicarious antitrust liability
principle and apparent authority agency standard by which it upheld the
antitrust liability of ASME for the misconduct of its two members. This
approach, however, was totally unrealistic because it completely begged
the question of how, .. ASME might have avoided a finding of conspiratorial intent. Id.
44. 102 S. Ct. at 1944, 1949, 1950.
45. E.g., 102 S. Ct. at 1942 ("ASME wields great power in the nations economy.
Its codes and standards influence the policies of numerous states and cities ...
ASME permits its agents to affect the destinies of businesses and thus gives them the
power to frustrate competition in the marketplace.") Id. at 1944; ("A standard-setting
organization like ASME can be rife with opportunities for anticompetitive activity.")
Id. at 1945; ("The anticompetitive practices of ASME's agents are repugnant to the
antitrust laws. . .

.")

Id. at 1946; ("ASME's agents

. . .

are able to affect the lives of

large numbers of people and the competitive fortunes of businesses throughout the
country. . . . We thus make it less likely that competitive challenges like Hydrolevel
will be hindered by agents or organizations like ASME in the future.") Id. at 1948.
46. Id.
47. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. The author does not assert
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sition as to the use of apparent authority in antitrust actions is not
supported by precedent. 48 However, he follows the lead of the circuit
court by analogizing the antitrust action to a common law suit for
fraud or misrepresentation where apparent authority is permitted as an
49
exception to the conventional tort doctrine that disallows its use.
The Court quickly disposes of several other agency arguments by
asserting that its decision will "help ensure that standard-setting organizations will act with care when permitting their agents to speak for
them. '50 However, ASME's lack of due care is not an issue under the
apparent authority doctrine and arguably the Court attempts to
strengthen its argument by mixing the no fault apparent authority doctrine with a direct negligence or ratification theory requiring fault.
Since the Court states that apparent authority is the basis of the decision, any acts tending toward ASME's direct fault, ratification or actual authorization have no bearing on a finding of apparent authority
because the crux of the doctrine is the appearanceof authority to third
parties.1
The expansiveness of the Court's decision on vicarious antitrust liability is unclear as Justice Blackmun asserts, "We need not delineate
today the outer boundaries of standard-setting organizations for the ac'52
tions of their agents committed with apparent authority.
In a forceful dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justices White and
that ASME was faultless but only that the adoption of a no-fault apparent authority
doctrine does not require consideration of the principal's own wrongdoing and is an
overly expansive addition to the antitrust laws. Under the apparent authority theory
even the assumption that ASME was blameless in its own right requires the same
finding of liability. Thus, there is no way for a principal to guard against a treble
damages judgment when his agent intentionally violates the antitrust laws.
48. 102 S. Ct. at 1944 n.7 ("Evidently, in recent years no Court of Appeals other
than the Second Circuit (in Hydrolevel) has directly decided whether a principal can
be held liable for antitrust damages based on an apparent authority theory.")
49. 102 S. Ct. at 1942. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 257,
261, 262 (1957).
50. 102 S. Ct. at 1948.
51. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. See also 102 S. Ct. at 1956
n.18 ("The Courts theory [of apparent authority] makes ratification by ASME
irrelevant.").
52. 102 S. Ct. at 1948.
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Rehnquist,53 sets forth the primary weaknesses of the majority opinion
upon which this comment expounds: (1) apparent authority previously
had no application in antitrust law, (2) even when applied outside of
the antitrust area, apparent authority did not permit imputation of punitive damages to the principal, (3) the majority disregards the fact
that the Sherman Act section 1 claim brought against ASME requires
the defendant to engage in a conspiracy and (4) nonprofit organizations
previously have not been subjected to antitrust law's treble damages.
Apparent Authority and Antitrust Liability: An Incompatible
Combination
Apparent authority exists when an agent is not actually authorized
to act for the principal, but a third party reasonably believes the agent
acts with authority because the principal placed the agent in a position
creating this appearance. 54 After the principal initially creates the appearance of authority, apparent authority becomes a no fault concept
where the principal is liable even when the agent intentionally acts
against the principal's interests. 55 However, since the apparent authority concept is based on the objective theory of contracts, 56 it is generally applicable only to contractual relationships and certain limited areas of tort, such as fraud and misrepresentation. 57 For conventional
torts, the apparent authority doctrine has no application. 58 Since antitrust involves statutory law with actions brought neither in tort nor
contract, a choice between the two theories of liability was required.
53.

Id. at 1949.

54.

This definition does not encompass the complete scope of apparent authority

but rather is fitted to the situation in Hydrolevel. For complete definitions see supra
note 5.
55. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 57 (1964).
56.

Cook, Agency by Estoppel, 5 COL. L REv. 36 (1905), "[T]he thesis of the

present article is that the liability in question is a true contractual liability, as well
where the authority of the agent is only apparent as where it is real." Id. at 38. Compare H. REUSHLIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 23 (1979).
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 257, 261, 262 (1957).
58. The Second Circuit Court conceded that with conventional torts the principal
is liable only if he is at fault or the agent acts within his scope of employment with an
intent to benefit the principal. 635 F.2d at 125.
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The issue before the courts in Hydrolevel thus became whether an antitrust conspiracy to restrain trade should be analogized to either the
conventional torts (disallowing apparent authority liability) or the

fraud/misrepresentation type torts (permitting apparent authority liability) to justify adopting eithers' brand of vicarious liability, or
whether the antitrust action deserves an entirely distinct theory of
liability?59
Prior to Hydrolevel, the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts considering the questions of vicarious antitrust liability, without
exception, opted for the conventional tort-scope of employment-brand
of liability where the agent's unauthorized acts are imputed to the principal only when the acts are done with an intent to benefit the principal. 60 These courts have rejected the possibility of expanding vicarious
antitrust liability on an apparent authority basis either expressly or by
implication."1 Had the Court remained on this established course,
ASME's liability would rest on its own fault and not on unpreventable
fraudulent conduct designed to benefit another.

59. The district court chose to apply the conventional tort theory and refused to
allow ASME's liability on an apparent authority basis: Id. The circuit court admitted
that a vicarious liability choice was required but Justice Blackmun in adopting the
apparent authority theory failed to acknowledge the existence of the conventional tort
brand of vicarious liability or the necessity of choosing between the theories. Since
Hardin and James, the ASME agents, acted fraudulently and outside their scope of
employment, the conventional tort theory would find ASME liable only if it was independently at fault, but the apparent authority theory holds the principal liable regardless of his own fault. See supra note 5; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 257, 261, 262 (1957).
60. See 102 S. Ct. 1935, 1944 n.7, 1950 (dissent).
61. See United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 n.4 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied sub nom. Western Int'l Hotels Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973)
(citing Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th Cir.
1962)), ("A purpose to benefit the corporation is necessary. . . ."); United States v.

American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (3d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir. 1978).
But ef. Continental Baking Co. v. United States 281 F.2d 137, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1960);
United States V. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 468 n.5 (3d Cir. 1979) (not
mentioning apparent authority). Compare Hydrolevel, 102 S. Ct. at 1951 n.5.
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Applying Apparent Authority to Antitrust Law: A Deviation
From Precedent
In United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal 2 and Coronado Coal
v. United Mine Workers 3 the Supreme Court reversed decisions holding an international union vicariously liable for a local union's conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The president of
the international union, with apparent authority but no actual authority, assured certain local union members of funds for their strike involvement and otherwise appeared to authorize the strike.6 4 Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court, declared, "The president had no
authority to order or ratify a local strike. [His actions show] sympathy
with its purpose and a lack of respect for the law but [do] not imply or
prove on his part any initiation or indicate a desire to ratify the
transaction .... ,,65
The Court in Coronado Coal and United Mine Workers followed
the conventional tort basis of vicarious antitrust liability and rejected
the nofault apparent authority approach. It stated:
[A] trades-union

.

might be held liable . . . but certainly it

must be clearly shown in order to impose such a liability on an
association of 450,000 men that what was done was done by their
agents in accordance with their fundamental agreement of
association.
A corporation is responsible for the wrongs committed by its
agents in the course of its business . . . . But it must be shown
that it is in the business of the corporation. Surely no stricter rule

can be enforced against an unincorporated organization like this.6"

In Hydrolevel, Justice Blackmun's opinion summarily disposes of the
Coronado Coal and United Mine Workers precedent in a footnote by
asserting that, "Those cases, however, are not controlling here. The
Court [in Coronado Coal v. United Mine Workers] expressly pointed
out: 'Here it is not a question . . . of holding out an appearance of
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

259 U.S. 344 (1922).
268 U.S. 295 (1925).
Id. at 300, 303.
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 394.
Coronado Coal v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
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authority on which some third person acts.' "
Justice Blackmun utilizes a single sentence from fifty pages of precedent to assert that the two cases are not a rejection of the apparent
authority theory for antitrust litigation. The same interpretation of the
two cases and of the single-sentence excerpt is not adopted by the dissent nor by federal courts citing the cases as precedent.0 8 In rebutting
Justice Blackmun's claim, Justice Powell asserts, "The majority quotes
this language but misses its point. The United Mine Workers Court
well could have characterized the cases before it as involving an exercise of apparent authority by the local union or the national President;
it refused to do so. 9
Truck Drivers Local No. 421 v. United States70 quotes extensively
from United Mine Workers and Coronado Coal, including the excerpt
challenged by the majority in Hydrolevel. Truck Drivers ruled that "to
bind the union in an antitrust situation such as this, 1 actual and authorized agency was necessary; mere apparent authority would not be
sufficient to take the matter to the jury ....
In United States v. Ridglea State Bank," the Fifth Circuit eliminate was faced with the same choice over vicarious liability as the Supreme Court in Hydrolevel; whether a principal's liability for statutory
punitive damages should extend to apparently authorized agents acting
with no intent to benefit the principal, or whether the conventional tortscope of employment-basis should serve as the standard. Ridglea State
Bank involved a bank vice-president who fraudulently processed federally insured housing loans and subsequently shared the proceeds with
the defaulting borrower."4 The federal government sued the bank for

67. Hydrolevel, 102 S. Ct. at 1946 n.12.
68. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local No. 421 v. United States, 128 F.2d 227, 235
(8th Cir. 1942).
69. 102 S. Ct. 1950 n.5 and accompanying text.
70. 128 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1942).
71. Truck Drivers Local No. 421 involved a § I Sherman Act violation brought
against the Teamsters Union and others. The defendants were convicted of conspiring
to fix milk prices, but the decision was reversed by the Eighth Circuit holding that the
acts of the separate union divisions and of the individual union officials could not be
imputed to the entire organization unless actual authority or ratification were proved.
72. 128 F.2d at 235 (emphasis added).
73. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966).
74. Id. at 496-97.

Published by NSUWorks, 1983

13

Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 8

1 654
65

Nova Law Journal
oaLa

7:1983 1

oral718

the agents' fraud under the False Claims Act which imposed double
damages upon violators.
The Ridglea court granted that a principal is generally liable for
fraud or misrepresentation of an agent even when acting only with apparent authority.7 5 The court recognized the vicarious liability choice
before it and stated, "We find ourselves confronted with two rules on
the imputation of an agent's fraudulent intent to his employer and a
case which falls somewhere between the usual areas of the operation of
the two rules."76 By refusing to impute liability to the principal, the
court chose to view the application of apparent authority to common
law fraud as inapplicable to a statutory punitive damages action. It
stated, "All of these authorities concern civil actions to recover actual
loss caused by the misrepresentation of an employee; not, as here, actions to recover forfeitures and double damages far in excess of actual
loss. "78 Ridglea's logic for refusing to impose excessive statutory
double damages becomes even more powerful when applied to an antitrust action for treble damages.
Punitive Damages: An Unsound Extension
Hydrolevel also marks the unprecedented imputation of punitive
damages to a principal liable under the apparent authority doctrine.79
In permitting a treble damages judgment against ASME, the Court
disregards rigidly defined punitive damages boundaries which require
direct fault of the principal when his agent acts outside the scope of
employment. 80 In Hydrolevel, the Court places the immense burden of
punitive damages upon a principal who admittedly is not deserving of
punishment.8 1 It is deep-rooted in the law that exemplary damages can
75. Id. at 499.
76. Id.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 257(d) (1937).
78. Ridglea, 357 F.2d 499. Justice Blackmun cited to Ridglea but made no attempt to distinguish the case.
79. 102 S. Ct. at 1950-51. "Nor does the Court cite a single decision in which
the apparent authority theory of liability has been applied in a case involving treble or
punitive damages and an agent who acts without any intention of benefiting the principal." Id. at 1950.
80. Id. at 1950-51.
81. The Second Circuit Court characterized ASME's involvement as "uninten-
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be awarded only against one who has participated in the offense or
wrong complained of, 2 and are "not given against those liable, if at
all, [merely] by reason of their relation to the wrongdoer. .... ,83
The Supreme Court, in the 1893 landmark decision of Lake Shore
and Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice," held that "[a] principal .. .cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages
merely by reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent on the part
of the agent."' 5 In following Lake Shore and refusing to assess punitive
damages in an apparent agency situation, the court in Ridglea State
Banks' expounded upon "the rule . . that the knowledge or guilty
intent of an agent, not acting with a purpose to benefit his employer,
will not be imputed to the employer."' 7 The Hydrolevel Court discarded this rule and found ASME liable even though ASME did not
encourage or adopt the malevolent actions of its agents. ASME, in fact,
was a victim of its agents' active deception and could not benefit from,
nor guard against, conduct motivated by a desire to serve another."
In Hydrolevel, "the Court practically concedes that an apparent
authority rule of liability has rarely, if ever, been used to impose punitive damages upon the principal.""9 Justice Blackmun "[r]ather than
tional participation." 635 F.2d at 131.
82. Lake Shore & Michigan S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 56 App. D.C. 283, 12 F.2d 818 (1926); Hogg v. Plant, 145 Va.
175, 133 S.E. 759 (1926).

83. Graham v. St. Charles St. R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 1657, 18 So. 707, 708
(La. 1895) (emphasis added). See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages §§ 255 (1965)
("Exemplary damages are not recoverable against a defendant who acts in good
faith. . . .") Id. at § 255; (requiring the agent act within the scope of his employment)
Id. at § 258.
84. 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
85. Id. at 107.
86. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966).
87. Id. at 500. See also Note, CorporateCriminal Liability For Acts in Violation of Company Policy, 50 GEO. L.J. 547, 560 n.64 (1962), "[P]unitive damages are
penal in character and should be imposed in addition to compensatory damages only
where the corporate management has acted with malice or recklessness." See also
Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981) ("Before an
employer may be held vicariously liable for punitive damages under the doctrine of
respondent superior, there must be some fault on his part.").
88. See 102 S.Ct. at 1955.
89. Id. at 1951.
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contest this well-established rule of agency law . . . argues that treble
damages are not punitive or, even if they are, the purpose of the antitrust laws overrides the basic rule of the law of agency."90
Justice Blackmun's position as to the purpose and effect of antitrust treble damages is directly contra to earlier Supreme Court decisions, lower federal court rulings and the stance taken by the recognized commentators in the field.9" Justice Blackmun's assertion that,
"the antitrust private action was createdprimarily as a remedy for the
victims of antitrust violations," 92 is diametrically opposed to the Supreme Court's explication of the antitrust treble damages action in
1981. In Texas Industriesv. Radcliffe Materials,Inc., the Court ruled
that, "the very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past,
and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of
wrongdoers." 93 Justice Blackmun's new interpretation of treble damages as non-punitive is flatly rejected by Professors Areeda and Turner
as they state, "[W]hether or not compensatory damages ever punish,
treble damages are indisputably punishment. ' 94 Clearly, treble damages were "intended to be punitive in nature and deterrent in effect."'9 5
The wisdom of imputing the punishment of treble damages under
an apparent authority theory is also questionable in view of Ridglea
State Bank's rejection of apparent authority as a basis for imputing
double damages; "What is important for the proper decision of this
case is that the present action is not primarily one for the recovery of a
loss caused by an employee, but is one which, if successful, must result
in a recovery wholly out of proportion to actual loss."-96
Furthermore, apparent authority and punitive treble damages become overtly incompatible concepts when the basis for apparent agency
liability is reviewed. Apparent agency stems from the reasoning that
although the principal and plaintiff are both innocent parties to the

90.

Id. (emphasis added).

91.

See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.

92.
93.
94.

102 S. Ct. at 1947 (emphasis added).
451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (emphasis added).
2 AREEDA & TURNER § 311(b) (1978) ("In addition, treble damages consti-

tute punishment that is analogous in many ways to criminal sanctions."). See generally
K. ELZINGA, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES, A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (1977).
95. 1 H.A. TOULMIN, ANTITRUST LAWS § 20.5 (1949).
96.

357 F.2d at 500 (emphasis added).
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action, the plaintiff should not bear the loss since the principal's initial
relationship with the agent created the damaging situation.9 7 It is
anomalous, therefore, to subject the principal to three times the actual
damages suffered when the injured party, as in Hydrolevel, has alternative avenues for redress by way of a tort action in state court. 98
Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade: Unidentified or Abandoned?
ASME's liability emanates from a conspiracy in restraint of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act. 99 The Court analogizes this antitrust
action to a common law suit for fraud or misrepresentation 0 " but fails
to recognize that the antitrust conspiracy requires a plurality of actors
whereas the common law actions may be occasioned by a single perpetrator.101 It is rudimentary that one cannot conspire with oneself, 10 2 but
by finding ASME liable as a coconspirator with its own agents, the
Court ignores this basic tenet of antitrust and conspiracy law. While it
is clear that a business entity and its agents alone cannot constitute the
requisite plurality of actors in a conspiracy because the principal is one

97.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 159 (1957).

98. Hydrolevel could have utilized the apparent authority doctrine in a state
court tort action against ASME for fraud, misrepresentation, etc. to recover compensatory damages for its actual loss rather than treble damages from an antitrust claim.
Hydrolevel, in fact, initiated its action in tort for trade libel and interference with business relations, but eventually abandoned the claims. 635 F.2d 126, n.5. Since
Hydrolevel otherwise had the opportunity to seek redress, the Courts' autogenous theory of vicarious antitrust liability through apparent authority served no purpose other
than that of increasing the damages amount.
99. 102 S. Ct. 1956.
100. Id. at 1942.
101.

ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY

31 (1955).
102. 2 KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 9.7 (1980); Welling, Intra Corporate Plurality in Criminal Conspiracy Law 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1151, 1158 (1982);
Barndt, Two Trees Or One? - The Problem of Intra-EnterpriseConspiracy, 23 MONT.
L. REV. 158, 180 (1962) (if there is only one active participant "[r]egardless of
whether the action is brought against the corporation, the officer. . . or both, the only
possible result upon grounds of both logic and precedent, is that a violation of the
conspiracy portions of the Sherman Act cannot exist"). See generally Note, Developments in the Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920 (1959).
THE ANTITRUST LAWS

Published by NSUWorks, 1983

17

Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 8
1 658

Nova Law Journal

7:1983

with the agent, 03 it is unsettled whether this fundamental precept 1of4
business enterprise is likewise applicable to a non-profit association. 0
However, if logically extended to associations, the rule makes ASME's
relationship to its agents incapable of satisfying the plurality requirement of the Sherman Act, i.e. by definition, no conspiracy exists, thus
making the restraint of trade not violative of Sherman Act section 1.105
There is some authority holding that if the agent is outside his
scope of employment, as in Hydrolevel, the rule is vitiated making the
entity capable of conspiring with the agent.1 But this theory, if applied, also shields ASME from liability because if "James and Hardin
had sufficiently independent motivation to conspire with ASME, they
could not simultaneously and by the same act cause ASME to conspire
with them; otherwise, a single person acting alone could create a multiparty antitrust conspiracy." 107
The Hydrolevel Court failed to reconcile these rules of antitrust
and conspiracy law, and in fact, did not address the conspiracy issue.
As noted in the dissent, "The intersection of the law of agency and
vicarious liability with the law of conspiracy makes this a complex
case. Yet the Court does not recognize this complexity. Indeed, the
Court never identifies who conspired with whom." 108

103. Welling supra note 102, at 1158-67; See, e.g., Goldlaw, Inc. v. Shubert, 276
F.2d 614, 745 (3d Cir. 1960). Morton Bldgs. of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc.,
531 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1976); Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389
(5th Cir. 1976); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953)
It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or
entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any
more than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts
of the agent are the acts of the corporation.
Id. at 914.

104. See 2 KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS § 9.16 (1980) (Kintner argues
that this principle is not applicable to trade associations).
105. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
106. H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th
Cir. 1978); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399-400
(4th Cir. 1974).
107. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 13, American Soc'y Mechanical Eng'rs v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982) (emphasis original).
108. Hydrolevel, 102 S. Ct. at 1956 n.18.
"[The Court] so expands the concept of vicarious liability as to leave little
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Furthermore, liability for ASME, while only an "unintentional

participant"1 0 9 in an antitrust conspiracy, gives rise to the incongruous

concept that ASME was a coconspirator without intent." 0 However,
this arguably illogical concept is not foreign to the laws of antitrust
because it is a general rule "that a civil (antitrust) violation can be
established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect" (no intent).1 1 Even so, this long established rule does not
entirely vitiate the importance of the defendant's intent in a civil antitrust action. 1 2 Even when civil liability is primarily based upon a mere

anticompetitive effect, intent remains an important determinant.113 Arguably, then, if the antitrust defendant has no wrongful intent or
knowledge of a possible anticompetitive effect, as the Second Circuit
held in Hydrolevel,11 ' liability should be narrowly defined so as to exclude apparent authority as a basis 115 for liability. More importantly,
content, in this case, to the requirement in § 1 of the Sherman Act that
antitrust plaintiffs demonstrate a contract, combination or conspiracy. Did
James - acting for ASME - conspire with Hardin - acting for M & M
and Hartford Steam ... ? Or was it the other way around? Could it be

said under the Court's theory, that James conspired with himself - as a
double agent - thereby committing both of his "principals" to an antitrust conspiracy?"

Id.
109. Id. at 1956 (quoting the Second Circuit Court, 635 F.2d at 131).
110. See Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies,57 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 45 (1981). See also Howe & Badger, supra note 1, at 361-62, 388; W.
LAFAVE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW 464-65 (1972) ("in a conspiracy, two different
types of intent are generally required, the basic intent to agree, which is necessary to
establish the existence of the conspiracy, and the more traditional intent to effectuate
the object of the conspiracy.") Compare Note, Developments in the Law - Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 1000-05 (1959).
111. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978);
United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States 221
U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
112. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436 n.13.
113. Id. ("[o]f course consideration of intent may play an important role in divining the actual nature and effect of the alleged anti-competitive conduct"). See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
114. See 635 F.2d at 131.
115. Howe & Badger, supra note 1, at 388 ("proof of apparent agency, simply
should not be admissable").

Published by NSUWorks, 1983

19

Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 8
Nova Law Journal

660

7:1983

intent is clearly a significant factor in choosing the sanction to be imposed upon the antitrust violator, 118 and defendants without a wrongful
intent, such as ASME, should not be subject to punitive treble
damages. 11 7
In assessing the results of Justice Blackmun's refusal to deal with
these important but unsettled areas of conspiracy and antitrust law,
Justice Powell proclaims: "The Court simply opens new vistas in the
law of conspiracy and vicarious liability, as well as in the imposition of
the harsh penalty of punitive damages."11 8 "In view of this . . . one
would not have expected the Court to take the occasion of this case to
promulgate an expansive rule of antitrust liability not heretofore applied by it to a commercial enterprise much less to a nonprofit

organization." 119
Nonprofit Organizations: New Victims For Treble Damages
In holding ASME liable as a Sherman Act violator, the Supreme
Court "[substantially broadens] the treble damages concept' 20 by applying the strict sanction to a nonprofit organization for the first
time.1 21 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar1 22 the Court ruled that non-

116. Wirtz, supra note 110, at 44-47.
117. The question thus arises whether the mere act of entering, without a
wrongful purpose, into an agreemnet that proves to have anti-competitive
effects, renders a party liable to the full range of Sherman Act sanctions,
including treble damages and criminal punishment. It would be surprising
if the answer were yes.
Id. at 45. See also Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for State Action after Lafayette, 95
HARV. L. REV. 435, 455 (1981) ("[A]ntitrust liability does not necessarily call for a
damage remedy ... [T]he Supreme Court may come to agree that antitrust liability
may vary according to the remedies sought.").
118. 102 S.Ct. 1935, 1956. "[The Court] stretches the concept of vicarious liability beyond its rational limits to conceive of Hardin and James as conspiring on behalf of ASME when they acted . . . against the interests of ASME." Id. at 1936.
119. Id. at 1950.
120. Young, Court Widens Treble Damage Liabilityfor Nonprofit Societies, 68
A.B.A. J. 846 (1982).
121. Id. See also 102 S.Ct. at 1935, 1949 n.2.
122. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Goldfarb Court ruled that a state bar association's practice of publishing a minimum fee schedule for attorneys constituted pricefixing in violation of the Sherman Act, and was an enjoinable activity. Id.
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profit associations were not entirely exempt from the antitrust laws.123
However, in so doing the Court urged that such associations be allowed
a different standard of liability than the typical commercial antitrust
defendant. The Goldfarb Court ruled that:
It would be unrealistic to view [these associations] as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply .. .antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The

public service aspects and other features of the professions, may
require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed
as a violation
of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated
12
differently. 4
Goldfarb's holding that noncommercial organizations are deserving of a narrower view with respect to potential antitrust liability was
reiterated in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States125 where the Court upheld an injunction against a nonprofit society. The Court ruled that an appropriate antitrust remedy could be
"fashioned" for the nonprofit defendant, 26 and stated that, "the standard. . . is whether the relief represents a reasonablemethod of eliminating the consequences of the illegal conduct."12 Arguably, ASME's
treble damages liability does not follow this standard and, at best, actual damages might have served as a more appropriate sanction.12 8
Interestingly, the National Society of Professional Engineer's
holding was supported by Justice Blackmun who stated in a concurPrior to Goldfarb it was generally assumed that professional associations like
ASME, were exempt from the operations of antitrust laws. See Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13-15 (4th Cir. 1974); Bauer, Professional Activities and the
Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW., 570, 571-92 (1975).
123. 421 U.S. at 787.
124. Id. at 788 n.17.
125. 435 U.S. 679 (1978) ("We adhere to the view expressed in Goldfarb that,
by nature, professional services may differ significantly from other business services. . . ."). See generally Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the
Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67 GEo. L.J. 1187 (1979); Note, Rule of Reason,
Per Se Rule and Professional Groups: National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 20 B.C. L. REv. 716 (1979).
126. 435 U.S. at 697.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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. properly left to the

Court some flexibility in considering how to apply traditional Sherman
Act concepts to professions long consigned to self-regulation."129 Arguably, Hydrolevel sees this "flexibility" approach to nonprofit entities
ignored as the majority disregards ASME's nonprofit status1 30 and rigidly imposes treble damages. The Court states, "the fact that ASME is
a nonprofit organization does not weaken the force of the antitrust...
principles that indicate that ASME should be liable ....
132
Even though ASME was not a business competitor of anyone,
the Court, in finding the nonprofit organization liable, claims to follow
the intent of Congress. 33 In fact, the Congressional author of the antitrust act, Senator Sherman addressed the issue of extending liability
under the act to noncommercial entities such as ASME. He stated,
"[The act] does not interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations

. . .

to advance the interests of a particular trade or occupa-

tion. They are not business combinations. They do not deal with contracts, agreements, etc. They have no connection with them."14
Clearly, "this legislative history. . . counsel[s] against adopting a new

rule of agency law that extends the exposure of such [nonprofit] organizations to potentially destructive treble damage liability. 13 5
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in American Society of Mechanical
Engineers v. Hydrolevel 8 expands potential antitrust liability by rejecting four established principles of liability: (1) the apparent authority theory of the law of agency previously had no application in anti129. 435 U.S. at 699 (emphasis added).
130. 102 S. Ct. 1947 ("in addition, ASME contends it should not bear the risk
of loss for antitrust violations committed by its agents acting with apparent authority
because it is a nonprofit organization, not a business seeking profit. But it is beyond
debate that nonprofit organizations can be held liable").
131. Id. at 1947-48 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 1956.
133. Id. at 1943 n.6.
134. 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890).
135. 102 S. Ct. at 1952.
136. Id. at 1935.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/8

22

Palmer: Apparent Authority and Antitrust Liability: An Incompatible Combi
17:1983

Apparent Authority and Antitrust Liability

663 1

trust law, 137 (2) when apparent authority was used outside the antitrust
area, it disallowed imputation of punitive damages to the principal, 38
(3) a Sherman Act conspiracy to restrain trade generally required a
plurality of actors'3 9 and (4) nonprofit organizations previously were
free from the treble damages sanction for liability in antitrust. 40
Hydrolevel unnecessarily "launches on an uncharted course"' 41 by
broadening antitrust liability, especially because ASME was already
found responsible by the district court on traditional antitrust grounds.
James R. Palmer

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See
See
See
See
102

supra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
supra notes 79 - 98 and accompanying text.
supra notes 99 - 119 and accompanying text.
supra notes 120 - 135 and accompanying text.
S. Ct. at 1951. (Powell, J., Dissent).
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